MAY 16 2003

Mr. Barry Pearl
Chief Executive Officer
Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company
2929 Allen Parkway
Houston, TX 77252-2521

Re: CPF No. 3-2003-5014H

Dear Mr. Pearl:

Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in the above-referenced case. It requires you to take certain corrective actions, including a pressure reduction, with respect to your 8-inch hazardous liquid pipeline running from the Todhunter Pump Station in Butler County, Ohio to the Greensburg Pump Station in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.

Sincerely,

Gwendolyn M. Hill
Pipeline Compliance Registry
Office of Pipeline Safety

Enclosure

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL (RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED) AND TELECOPY
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20590

In the Matter of
Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company
Respondent.

CPF No. 3-2003-5014H

CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER

Purpose and Background

This Corrective Action Order is being issued, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a failure involving the P-42 and A-1 segments of Respondent’s 8-inch highly volatile liquid (HVL) pipeline extending from the Todhunter Pump Station in Butler County, Ohio to the Greensburg Pump Station in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania (hereafter, “the affected segment”).

On May 9, 2003, a failure occurred on the affected segment near the town of Lebanon, Ohio. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) initiated an investigation of the incident.

Preliminary Findings

- On May 9, 2003, at approximately 10:15 A.M. EST, Respondent’s 8-inch HVL pipeline ruptured in Warren County, OH resulting in the release of propane gas.

- The failure occurred at Mile Post (MP) 9.58 where the pipeline crosses State Highway 122, approximately three miles northwest of the town of Lebanon, OH.

- No fires, injuries, or fatalities were reported in connection with the incident.

- The escaping propane resulted in a large vapor cloud and approximately 80 homes and one school within a two-mile radius had to be evacuated.
• The failure occurred inside of the casing where the pipeline crosses State Highway 122. The highway had to be temporarily closed due to the vapor cloud and rocks and debris in the roadway.

• Respondent’s 8-inch HVL pipeline transports propane and butane and is part of the Allegheny Pipeline System.

• The affected segment originates at the Todhunter Pump Station located near Middletown, OH and extends approximately 287 miles in a northeasterly direction to the Greensburg Station located near Greensburg, PA. Portions of the affected segment are routed near populated areas and cross numerous state and local highways.

• Following the failure, Respondent mitigated the release by shutting down the pump and reversing the flow at the Todhunter Pump Station. The Lebanon station block valve and the nearest upstream block valve approximately 6 miles away were promptly closed.

• The entire length of pipe crossing State Highway 122 was cut out and replaced with new pipe.

• The preliminary assessment indicated that the rupture is in the pipe body and is approximately 14-inches long and 6-inches wide. There were no indications of outside force damage to the ruptured section and no reports of any recent excavation activity in the vicinity. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined. Respondent has delivered the section of pipe containing the 14-inch long rupture to a metallurgist for detailed analysis.

• The affected segment was installed in 1962 and is constructed of 8-inch nominal diameter, 0.203-inch wall thickness, Grade X-42, seamless pipe manufactured by National Tube.

• The affected segment is cathodically protected by impressed current.

• The maximum allowable operating pressure is 1389 psig at the Todhunter Pump Station discharge point. At the time of the failure, the actual operating pressure at the Todhunter Pump Station discharge point was 1343 psig.

• The pipeline was hydrostatically tested in 1968 at a pressure of 1,780 psig.

• The pipeline was internally inspected in 1995 with a magnetic flux leakage in-line inspection tool. After the rupture, Respondent reviewed data logs for the vicinity of the failure site generated by the 1995 in-line inspection. No anomalies were noted during this review.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing

Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. §190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.

Section 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that failure to issue the Order expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.

After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of affected segment of Respondent’s 8-inch propane pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and the environment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas, the highly volatile nature of the product the pipeline transports, the pressure required for transporting the material, and the lack of any clear indication as to the cause of the failure, I find that a failure to expeditiously issue this Order requiring immediate corrective action would likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the environment.

Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.

Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered personally, by mail or by telety at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Kansas City, MO or Washington, DC on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent.

After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.

Required Corrective Action

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company to immediately take the following corrective actions with respect to its 8-inch HVL pipeline extending from the Todhunter Pump Station in Butler County, Ohio to the Greensburg Pump Station in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania:
1. Maintain an operating pressure on the affected segment not to exceed 80 percent of the operating pressure downstream of the Todhunter Pump Station just prior to the May 9, 2003 failure. Specifically, the pressure may not exceed 1074 psig at the Todhunter Pump Station discharge point. Reset the maximum discharge pressure set points on all other pump stations in the affected segment to not exceed 1074 psig. This pressure restriction shall remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline to full service is obtained from the Director, Central Region, OPS.

2. Determine the cause of the failure and identify any contributing factors by conducting detailed metallurgical analysis of the ruptured section of pipe. Provide the Director, Central Region, OPS with the date scheduled for this testing, which OPS may elect to witness. Submit all metallurgical and failure analysis reports to the Regional Director within 7 days of receiving them.

3. Within 30 days of your receipt of this Order, submit a written plan for prior approval by the Director, Central Region, OPS.

4. The plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the affected segment and must address all known or suspected factors in the May 9, 2003 failure including, as applicable:

   a. the performance of appropriate repairs or other remedial actions fully addressing all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to the failure;

   b. the use of a high resolution in-line inspection tool to identify any anomalies or other integrity concerns on the affected segment;

   c. the integration of available operational data from internal inspections, metallurgical testing, repair records, cathodic protection records, hydrostatic testing, and other historical data for the purpose of identifying causal factors or other integrity threats on the affected segment;

   d. a detailed description of the assessment criteria that will be used in the evaluation and prioritization of any anomalies that are identified;

   e. a detailed description of the repair criteria that will be used in addressing the anomalies that are excavated;

   f. a proposed schedule for completion of the testing and repairs.

5. Submit the results of the in-line inspection required by Item 4b to the Director, Central Region, OPS, including information on the nature of any anomalies encountered, anomaly location, and proposed method of remediation, within 20 days of receiving the results from the tool vendor.
6. The plan must be revised as necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure analysis and integrity assessment actions required by this Order. Submit plan revisions to the Director, Central Region, OPS for prior approval.

7. Submit the plan to: Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, 901 Locust Street, Suite 462, Kansas City, MO 64106-2641. The Regional Director may approve plan elements incrementally. Implement the plan as approved, including any revisions to the plan.

8. If approval of the Director, Central Region, OPS, is requested to remove or modify the pressure restriction set forth in Item 1, Respondent must submit information demonstrating that the hazard has been abated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline.

9. The Director, Central Region, OPS may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing.

10. The corrective actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to the affected segment under the integrity management program regulations.

Respondent may appeal any decision of the Regional Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.

Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than $100,000 per day and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court.

Stacey Gerard
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety

MAY 16 2003
Date Issued