



U.S. Department
of Transportation

**Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety
Administration**

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

MAY 21 2015

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 713-646-4378

Troy Valenzuela
Vice President EHS
Plains Pipeline, LP
333 Clay Street, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77002


Re: CPF No. 5-2015-5011H

Dear Mr. Valenzuela:

Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Plains Pipeline, LP to take certain corrective actions with respect to Line 901 of your pipeline system that failed on May 19, 2015, near Santa Barbara, CA. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the Corrective Action Order by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,


Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

Enclosure

cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590**

_____))
In the Matter of))
))
Plains Pipeline, LP,))
))
Respondent.))
_____)

CPF No. 5-2015-5011H

CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER

Purpose and Background:

This Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with the recent failure on your pipeline in Santa Barbara County, California.

On May 19, 2015, a reportable accident occurred on Plains' Line 901 pipeline, resulting in the release of approximately 1700 to 2500 barrels of heavy crude oil (Failure). Line 901 is a 24-inch diameter pipeline approximately 10.6 miles in length that transports crude oil from Exxon Mobil's breakout storage tanks in Las Flores Canyon to Plains' Gaviota Pump Station. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows:

Preliminary Findings:

- Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains), is a publicly traded master limited partnership that operates approximately 17,800 miles of crude oil and natural gas liquids pipelines and gathering systems throughout the United States, including California and Texas.¹
- The failed pipeline is a 24-inch diameter line that transports crude oil and runs from Exxon Mobil's breakout storage tanks in Las Flores Canyon to Plains' Gaviota Pump Station, a distance of approximately 10.6 miles (Affected Pipeline). The Failure occurred near milepost 4 near Goleta, California (Failure Site).

¹ <https://www.plainsallamerican.com/what-we-do/transportation> (last accessed May 20, 2015)

- The Affected Pipeline was constructed from 1987-1990, and consists of .344 wall thickness, X-65 high frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe manufactured by Nippon Steel.
- The Affected Pipeline has a Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of 1025 psig and the normal operating pressure is 650 psig. Plains initially reported that the line pressure was approximately 700 psig immediately prior to failure.
- The initial hydrostatic test on the Affected Pipeline was conducted in October 1990, to a pressure of 1719 psig held for 8 hours.
- The Affected Pipeline is insulated and operates at up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit. There are shrink wrap sleeves at some of the pipeline's girth welds.
- The Affected Pipeline was recently smart-pigged on May 5, 2015. Complete in-line inspection (ILI) data was collected but the operator has not yet received a formal report from the ILI vendor regarding the analysis of the data and identification of any anomalies requiring further investigation according to the Federal pipeline safety regulations.
- Previous ILIs were performed in June 2007 and July 2012. In 2007 and 2012, there were 13 and 41 excavations of ILI-identified anomalies on the pipeline, respectively. These anomalies were mostly due to external corrosion, frequently located near the pipeline's girth welds.
- The Failure was discovered by the operator on May 19, 2015 around 1:30 p.m. PST, and reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report No. 1116972) at 2:56 p.m. PST. The operator reported an estimated spill of more than 500 BBLs of crude oil in their NRC report, but stated there was limited information available at that time.
- Prior to the discovery of the Failure, the controller of Line 901 noticed anomalies in the operating pressure, shut down and isolated the line around 11:30 am PST, and called field personnel to investigate.
- Another NRC report (No. 1116950) was received by the National Response Center at 12:43 p.m. from the Santa Barbara Dispatch reporting an unknown oil sheen at Refugio Beach.
- The release occurred on the north side of the Pacific Coast Highway. The released product traveled southward through a nearby water drainage culvert approximately ¼ mile to Refugio State Beach, where the product entered the Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that product has spread several miles down the coast.
- The estimated release amount was reported to have increased to 1700 to 2500 BBLs by the Unified Command center on the afternoon of May 20th.

- Refugio State Beach and camp grounds have been closed due to the oil spill. There were no reports of injuries.
- Several areas of environmental sensitivity are located near the Failure Site, including Bell Canyon, Tecolote Canyon, the City of Gaviota, and Coal Oil Point Reserve.
- Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, California County Office of Emergency Services, and local fire department(s). Private oil spill response organizations under contract with Plains and Exxon Mobil personnel are also responding. Clean-up operations are underway.
- The cause of the Failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing.

Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:

Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.

Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that failure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.

After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the pipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. Additionally, having considered the uncertainties as to the cause of the Failure, the location of the Failure, the material being transported, and the proximity of the pipeline to the Pacific Ocean and environmentally sensitive areas, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.

Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.

Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance and obtain expedited review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person in Denver, Colorado, or Washington, D.C.

After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Pipeline or Plains' Line 903. In that event, PHMSA will notify Respondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order will be issued, if necessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.

Required Corrective Actions:

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Plains to immediately take the following corrective actions for the Affected Pipeline:

1. ***Shutdown.*** Plains must not operate the Affected Pipeline until authorized to do so by the Director.
2. ***Empty and Purge the Affected Pipeline.*** Plains must empty and purge the Affected Pipeline and fill with an inert gas until Items 3 through 8 of this Order are completed. This purging must be done as soon as practicable after repairing the Failure Site, but no longer than 10 days after receipt of this Order.
 - a. Plains must notify the Director and local and State responders prior to conducting the purging operations.
 - b. Plains must conduct the purging operations during daylight hours and monitor the pipeline right of way continually to quickly identify and contain any releases should they occur.
3. ***Review of Affected Pipeline.*** Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, Plains must review the Affected Pipeline for conditions similar to those of the Failure. Plains must address any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to restart. This review must include:
 - a. All construction, operating and maintenance (O&M) and integrity management records, such as hydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols, corrosion protection, One Call tickets, excavations and exposed pipe records, and pipe replacements;
 - b. Identification of all areas of the Affected Pipeline that have insulated pipe and girth welds with “shrink wrap” sleeves;
 - c. All ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, including a followup review of the ILI vendors' raw data and analysis from pre-2015 ILI surveys and a first time review of the data from the ILI survey conducted on May 5, 2015. Determine whether any anomalies were present in the failed pipe joint and any other pipe removed near the Failure Site. Determine whether any anomalies with similar characteristics are present elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline. Plains must submit documentation of this ILI review to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:
 - i. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs conducted on Line 901.
 - ii. Provide all ILI data from the past 10 years to the Director for review by a 3rd party ILI data analyst.

- iii. Explain the process that was used to review the past ILI results, and the process that will be used during the reevaluation.
 - iv. List and describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.) the specific locations of all ILI features from the ILI surveys conducted prior to the May 5, 2015 survey. Include the disposition of those requiring investigation per 49 CFR Part 195.452(h) or Plains's remediation criteria.
 - v. List and describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.) the specific location of all ILI features identified by the May 5, 2015 ILI survey that are present in the failed joint and other pipe removed near the Failure Site.
 - vi. List and describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.) the specific location of all ILI features identified by the May 5, 2015 ILI survey that require investigation per 49 CFR Part 195.452(h) elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline. If an ILI feature or anomaly is identified to be associated with the Failure Site, all features with similar characteristics elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline must be investigated and remediated.
4. **Records Verification.** As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, Plains must verify the records for the Affected Pipeline to confirm the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP). Plains must submit documentation of this records verification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.
5. **Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing.** Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and analysis as follows:
- a. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section and other evidence from the Failure Site. The removal and protection of the failed pipe section shall be done in the presence a PHMSA representative, and all failure surfaces shall be protected from damage or contamination during removal and subsequent storage prior to testing.
 - b. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.
 - c. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative to witness the testing.
 - d. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports, whether draft or final, in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Plains.
6. **Root Cause Failure Analysis.** Within 60 days following receipt of this Order, complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director. The RCFA must be facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the Failure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within Plains' pipeline system.
7. **Remedial Work Plan.** Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, provide a plan to the Director for his approval to investigate and remediate all actionable anomalies per 49 CFR

Part 195.452(h) and anomalies similar to those that may have led to the release at the Failure site.

8. **Restart Plan.** Prior to resuming operation of the Affected Pipeline, Plains must develop and submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.
 - a. The Restart Plan may only be requested after completion of Items 2 through 7 of this Order.
 - b. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all mandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural modifications are incorporated into Plains' operations and maintenance procedures manual.
 - c. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Affected Pipeline during the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases during start-up, with each increment to be held for at least 2 hours.
 - d. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each pressure increment to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes.
 - e. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications with local emergency response officials.
 - f. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into this Order.
9. **Return to Service.** After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Plains may return the Affected Pipeline to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on May 19, 2015.
10. **Removal of Pressure Restriction.**
 - a. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a written request from Plains demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.
 - b. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions upon a written request from Plains demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on the failure cause and provision of evidence that preventive and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation of the Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction.
11. **Emergency Response Plan and Training Review.** Plains must review and assess the effectiveness of its emergency response plan and Bakersfield Spill Response Plan – Sequence 0107 with regards to the Failure. Include in the assessment a detailed review of the on-scene response and support activities (including timeline), coordination with all parties (including regulatory requests and proceeding with work), site security (including all phases of the response), procedures for improvements, lessons learned, and communication with the National Response Center, emergency responders, third party contractors, public officials, and internal resources. Include a review and assessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program. Plains must amend its emergency response plan and

emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this review. Documentation of this *Emergency Response Plan and Training Review* must be provided to the Director. Revisions to the Bakersfield Spill Response Plan must be submitted to the Director, Emergency Support and Security Division, for review and approval in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 194.

12. **CAO Documentation Report (CDR).** Plains must create and revise, as necessary, a Corrective Action Order Documentation Report (CDR). When Plains has concluded all the items in this Order, the company will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete a thorough review of all actions taken by Plains according to this Order prior to approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and documentation associated with this Order in one document.
 - a. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.
 - b. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this Order.
 - c. The CDR must include but not be limited to:
 - i. Table of Contents;
 - ii. Summary of the Failure and all response activities;
 - iii. Summary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the Affected Pipeline;
 - iv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required by this Order;
 - v. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing, as required by this Order;
 - vi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes, as required by this Order;
 - vii. Lessons learned while completing this Order;
 - viii. A path forward describing specific actions Plains will take on its entire pipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order

Other Requirements:

1. **Reporting.** Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first report is due on June 21. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these reports.
2. **Documentation of Costs.** It is requested but not required that Plains maintain documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each monthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.
3. **Approvals.** With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the Director may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission

on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Plains to modify the submission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Plains must proceed to take all actions required by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of a submission, Plains must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.

4. **Extensions of Time.** The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating good cause for an extension.

The actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, *et seq.*, or under any other provision of Federal or State law. **After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Pipeline or Plains' Line 903.**

Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.


Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).

Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60120.

In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 5-2015-5011H and for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.

The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.

MAY 21 2015



Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

Date Issued